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Abstract
Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solving large-scale
extensive-form games. State-of-the-art methods rely on mini-
mizing regret locally at each decision point. In this work we
derive a new framework for regret minimization on sequen-
tial decision problems and extensive-form games with general
compact convex sets at each decision point and general convex
losses, as opposed to prior work which has been for simplex
decision points and linear losses. We call our framework lam-
inar regret decomposition. It generalizes the CFR algorithm
to this more general setting. Furthermore, our framework en-
ables a new proof of CFR even in the known setting, which
is derived from a perspective of decomposing polytope regret,
thereby leading to an arguably simpler interpretation of the
algorithm. Our generalization to convex compact sets and con-
vex losses allows us to develop new algorithms for several
problems: regularized sequential decision making, regular-
ized Nash equilibria in extensive-form games, and computing
approximate extensive-form perfect equilibria. Our general-
ization also leads to the first regret-minimization algorithm
for computing reduced-normal-form quantal response equi-
libria based on minimizing local regrets. Experiments show
that our framework leads to algorithms that scale at a rate
comparable to the fastest variants of counterfactual regret min-
imization for computing Nash equilibrium, and therefore our
approach leads to the first algorithm for computing quantal
response equilibria in extremely large games. Finally we show
that our framework enables a new kind of scalable opponent
exploitation approach.
Introduction
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al.,
2007), and the newest variant CFR+ (Tammelin et al., 2015),
have been a central component in several recent milestones in
solving imperfect-information extensive-form games (EFGs).
Bowling et al. (2015) used CFR+ to near-optimally solve
heads-up limit Texas hold’em. Brown and Sandholm (2017)
and Moravcˇı´k et al. (2017) used CFR variants, along with
other scalability techniques, to create AIs that beat profes-
sional poker players at the larger game of heads-up no-limit
Texas hold’em.
We can view the CFR approach more generally as a
methodology for setting up regret minimization for sequential
decision problems (whether single- or multi-agent), where
each decision point requires selecting either an action or a
point from the probability distribution over actions. The crux
of CFR is counterfactual regret, which leads to a definition of
regret local to each decision point. CFR can then be viewed
as the observation, and proof, that bounds on counterfactual
regret, which can be minimized locally, lead to bounds on the
overall regret. To minimize local regret, the framework relies
on regret minimizers that operate on a simplex (typically
of probabilities over the available actions), such as regret
matching (RM) (Blackwell, 1956) or the newer variant regret
matching+ (RM+) (Tammelin et al., 2015).
In this paper we consider the more general problem of
how to minimize regret over a sequential decision-making
(SDM) polytope, where we allow arbitrary compact convex
subsets of simplexes at each decision point (as opposed to
only simplexes in CFR), and general convex loss functions
(as opposed to only linear losses in CFR). This allows us
to model a form of online convex optimization over SDM
polytopes. We derive a decomposition of the polytope regret
into local regret at each decision point. This allows us to
minimize regret locally as with CFR, but for general com-
pact convex decision points and convex losses. We call our
decomposition laminar regret decomposition (LRD). We call
our overall framework for convex losses and compact convex
decision points laminar regret minimization (LRM). As a spe-
cial case, our framework provides an alternate view of why
CFR works—one that may be more intuitive for those with a
background in online convex optimization.
Our generalization to general compact convex sets (we
restrict our attention to convex subsets of simplexes, but this
is without loss of generality due to the convexity-preserving
properties of affine transformations) allows us to model enti-
ties such as -perturbed simplexes (Farina and Gatti, 2017;
Farina, Kroer, and Sandholm, 2017; Kroer, Farina, and Sand-
holm, 2017), and thus yields new algorithms for computing
approximate equilibrium refinements for EFGs.
General convex losses in SDM and EFG contexts have, to
the best of our knowledge, not been considered before. This
generalization enables fast algorithms for many new settings.
One is to compute regularized zero-sum equilibria. If we
apply a convex regularization function at each simplex, we
can apply our framework to solve the resulting game. For the
negative entropy regularizer this is equivalent to the dilated
entropy distance function used for solving EFGs with first-
order methods (Hoda et al., 2010; Kroer et al., 2015, 2017).
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Ling, Fang, and Kolter (2018) show that dilated-entropy-
regularized EFGs are equivalent to quantal response equilib-
ria (QRE) in the corresponding reduced normal-form game.
Thus our result yields the first regret-minimization algorithm
for computing reduced-normal-form quantal response equi-
libria in EFGs.
Our experiments show that QREs and `2-regularized equi-
libria can be computed at a rate that is competitive with that
of CFR+ for computing Nash equilibria, and substantially
faster in some cases. This shows that our approach can be
used to compute regularized equilibria in extremely large
games such as real poker games. We go on to show that our
framework also enables a new kind of opponent-exploitation
approach for extremely large games, by adding a convex
regularizer that penalizes the exploiter for being far away
from a pre-computed Nash equilibrium, and thus potentially
exploitable herself.
Regret Minimization
We work the online learning framework called online convex
optimization (Zinkevich, 2003). In this setting, a decision
maker repeatedly plays against an unknown environment by
making a sequence of decisions x1, x2, . . . . As customary,
we assume that the set X ⊆ Rn of all possible decisions for
the decision maker is convex and compact. The outcome of
each decision xt is evaluated as `t(xt), where `t is a convex
function unknown to the decision maker until the decision is
made. Abstractly, a regret minimizer is a device that supports
two operations:
• it gives a recommendation for the next decision xt+1 ∈ X;
• it receives/observes the convex loss function `t used to
“evaluate” decision xt.
The learning is online in the sense that the decision
maker/regret minimizer’s next decision, xt+1, is based only
on the previous decisions x1, . . . , xt and corresponding loss
observations `1, . . . , `t.
In this paper, we adopt (external) regret as a way to evalu-
ate the quality of the regret minimizer. Formally, the cumula-
tive regret at time T is defined as
RT :=
T∑
t=1
`t(xt)−min
xˆ∈X
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ),
It measures the difference between the loss cumulated by
the sequence of decisions x1, . . . , xT and the loss that would
have been cumulated by playing the best time-independent
decision xˆ in hindsight. A desirable property of a regret mini-
mizer is Hannan consistency: the average regret approaches
zero, that is, RT grows at a sublinear rate in T .
We now review a particular very general regret-
minimization algorithm: online mirror descent (OMD). The
generality of OMD arises because it performs updates in the
dual space, where the duality is given by a mirror map Φ, a
strongly-convex differentiable function on X which defines
a vector field in which gradient updates are performed. At
each time step OMD performs the following update:
∇Φ(yt+1) = ∇Φ(yt)− η∇`t(xt),
and then recommends the point
xt+1 = arg min
x∈X
Φ(x)− 〈∇Φ(yt+1), x〉.
If OMD is initialized with ∇Φ(y1) = 0 and x1 as the
corresponding minimizer, it satisfies the regret bound
RT ≤ max
u,v∈X
{Φ(u)− Φ(v)}+ η
T∑
t=1
‖∇`t(xt)‖2∗,
where ‖ · ‖∗ is the dual norm with respect to which Φ is
strongly convex. OMD is very general in the sense that we
can choose Φ and the norm for measuring strong convexity
so that it fits the problem at hand. For example, this allows
only a logarithmic dependence on the dimension of X when
X = ∆n and Φ is the negative entropy. By specific choices of
η and Φ it is possible to show that this algorithm generalizes
online variants of gradient descent, exponential weights, and
regularized follow-the-leader (Zinkevich, 2003; Hazan and
Kale, 2010; Hazan, 2016). The regret generally grows at a
rate of T−1/2 for these algorithms.
We could also run OMD with X being the entire SDM
polytope. For example, we could do that by applying the
distance generating function (DGF) of Kroer et al. (2017).
However, decomposition into local regret minimization at
each decision point has been dramatically more effective in
practice, possibly because this allows better leveraging of the
structure of the problem.
Linear losses and games. Regret minimization methods
for normal-form and extensive-form games usually involve
minimizing the regret induced by linear loss functions. When
the domain at each decision point Xj is the nj-dimensional
simplex ∆nj , the two most successful regret-minimizers in
practice have been regret matching (Blackwell, 1956) and
regret matching+ (Tammelin et al., 2015). These regret min-
imizers also have regret that grows at a rate T−1/2 as with
OMD, but they have a worse dependence on the dimension
nj . Nonetheless, they seem to perform better in practice when
coupled with CFR.
Sequential Decision Making
It turns out that the results of this paper can be proven in a
general setting which we call a sequential decision making.
At each stage, the agent chooses a point in a simplex (or a
subset of it). The chosen point incurs a convex loss and de-
fines a probability distribution over the actions of the simplex.
An action is sampled according to the chosen distribution,
and the agent then arrives at a next decision point, potentially
randomly selected out of several candidates. The reason the
agent chooses points in the convex hull of actions, rather than
simply an action, is that this gives us greater flexibility in
representing decision points where agents wish to randomize
over actions. This is the case for example in game-theoretic
equilibria or when solving the decision-making problem with
an iterative optimization algorithm.
Formally, we assume that we have a set of decision points
J . Each decision point j ∈ J has a set of actions Aj of size
nj . The decision space at each decision point j is represented
by a convex set Xj ⊆ ∆nj . A point xj ∈ Xj represents a
probability distribution over Aj . When a point xj is chosen,
an action is sampled randomly according to xj . Given a
specific action at j, the set of possible decision points that the
agent may next face is denoted by Cj,a. It can be an empty
set if no more actions are taken after j, a. We assume that the
decision points form a tree, that is, Cj,a ∩ Cj′,a′ = ∅ for all
other convex sets and action choices j′, a′. This condition is
equivalent to the perfect-recall assumption in extensive-form
games, and to conditioning on the full sequence of actions and
observations in a finite-horizon partially-observable decision
process. In our definition, the decision space starts with a
root decision point, whereas in practice multiple root decision
points may be needed, for example in order to model different
starting hands in card games. Multiple root decision points
can be modeled in our framework by having a dummy root
decision point with only a single action.
The set of possible next decision points after choosing
action a ∈ Aj at Xj , denoted Cj,a, can be thought of as
representing the different decision points that an agent may
face after taking action a and then making an observation on
which she can condition her next action choice. For example,
in a card game an action may be to raise (that is, put money
into the pot), and an observation could be the set of actions
taken by the other players, as well as any cards dealt out, until
the agent acts again. Each specific observation of actions and
cards then corresponds to a specific decision point in Cj,a.
We will relate the regret over the whole decision space to
regret at subtrees in the decision space and individual convex
sets. In order to do that we need ways to refer to each of these
structures. Given a strategy x, xj is the (sub)vector belonging
to the decision space Xj at decision point j. Similarly, xj,a
is the scalar associated with action a ∈ Aj at decision point
j, and in typical applications it is the probability of choosing
action a at decision point j. Subscript4j denotes the portion
of x containing the decision variables for decision point j
and all its descendants. Finally, x refers to the vector for the
whole treeplex, which corresponds to subscript4r where r
is the root of the tree.
As an illustration, consider the game of Kuhn poker (Kuhn,
1950). Kuhn poker consists of a three-card deck: king, queen,
and jack. Each player is dealt one of the three cards and a
single round of betting occurs. A complete game descrip-
tion is given in the appendix. The action space for the
first player is shown in Figure 1. For instance, we have:
J = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}; n0 = 1, X0 = ∆1 = {1};
nj = 2, Xj = ∆2 for all j ∈ J \ {0}; A0 = {start},
A1 = A2 = A3 = {check, raise}, A4 = A5 = A6 =
{fold, call}; C0,start = {1, 2, 3}, C1,raise = ∅, C3,check = {6};
X41 = X1 × X4, X44 = X4; x1 = [x1,check, x1,raise];
x41 = [x1;x4], etc.
X0
X3
X6
X2
X5
X1
X4
start
fold call fold call fold call
check raise check raise check raise
jack queen king
check raise check raise check raise
Figure 1: Sequential action space for the first player in the
game of Kuhn poker. denotes an observation point;
represents the end of the decision process.
In addition to games, our model captures, for example,
POMDPs and MDPs where we condition on the entire history
of observations and actions.
Regret in Sequential Decision Making
We assume that we are playing a sequence of T iterations of
a sequential decision process. At each iteration t we choose a
strategy x ∈ X and are then given a loss function of the form
`t(x) :=
∑
j∈J
pij(x)`
t
j(xj), (1)
where `tj : Xj → R is a convex function for each j ∈ J . We
coin loss functions of this form separable, and they will play
an important role in our results. Our goal is to compute a new
strategy vector xt such that the regret across all T iterations
is as low as possible against any sequence of loss functions.
We now summarize definitions for the value and regret
associated with convex sets and strategies. First we have the
value of convex set j at iteration t when following strategy xˆ:
Vˆ t4j (xˆ4j ) := `
t
j(xˆ
t
j) +
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cj,a
xˆj,aVˆ
t
4j′ (xˆ4j′ ).
This definition denotes the utility associated with starting
at convex set Xj rather than at the root. Thus we have ex-
changed the term pij(x) with one for `tj and with xˆj,a for
V t4j′ ; this allows us to write the value as a recurrence. We
will be particularly interested in the value of xt, which we
denote V t4j := Vˆ
t
4j (x
t
4j ).
Now we can define the cumulative regret at convex set j
across all T iterations as
RT4j :=
T∑
t=1
V t4j −minxˆ4j
T∑
t=1
.Vˆ t4j (xˆ4j ),
This can equivalently be stated as
min
xˆ4j
T∑
t=1
Vˆ t4j (xˆ4j ) =
T∑
t=1
V t4j −RT4j . (2)
Finally, average regret is R¯T4j =
1
TR
T
4j .
Laminar Regret Decomposition
We now define a new parameterized class of loss functions for
each subtreeXj which we will show can be used to minimize
regret overX by minimizing that loss function independently
at each convex set Xj . The loss function is
ˆ`t
j(xj) :=`
t
j(xj) +
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cj,a
xj,aV
t
4j′ . (3)
It is convex since `tj is convex by hypothesis and we are
only adding a linear term to it. Strict convexity is also pre-
served, and for strongly convex losses, the strong convexity
parameter remains unchanged.
We now prove that the regret at information set j decom-
poses into regret terms depending on ˆ`tj and a sum over the
regret at child convex sets:
Theorem 1. The cumulative regret at a decision point j can
be decomposed as
RT4j =
T∑
t=1
ˆ`t
j(x
t)− min
xˆj∈Xj
{ T∑
t=1
ˆ`t
j(xˆj)−
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cj,a
xˆj,aR
T
4j′
}
Proof. By definition, the cumulative regret RT4j at time T
for decision point j is:
T∑
t=1
V t4j −minxˆ4j
{ T∑
t=1
`tj(xˆj) +
T∑
t=1
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cj,a
xˆj,aVˆ
t
4j′ (xˆ4j′ )
}
=
T∑
t=1
V t4j − minxˆj∈Xj
{ T∑
t=1
`tj(xˆj)
+
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cj,a
xˆj,a min
xˆ4
j′
T∑
t=1
Vˆ t4j′ (xˆ4j′ )
}
, (4)
where the equalities follow first from expanding the defini-
tions of RT4j and Vˆ
t
4j (xˆ4j ), and then using the fact that we
can sequentially minimize first over choices at j and then
over choices for child information sets.
Now we can use (2) to get that (4) is equal to
=
T∑
t=1
V t4j− minxˆj∈Xj
( T∑
t=1
ˆ`t
j(xˆj)−
∑
a∈Aj
xˆj,a
∑
j′∈Cj,a
Rt4j′
)
. (5)
Since V t4j already depends on V
t
4j′ for each child decision
point j′ we have V t4j =
ˆ`t
j(x
t
j), where the equality follows
by the definition of ˆ`tj . Substituting this equality in (5) yields
the statement.
Theorem 1 justifies the introduction of the concept of lam-
inar regret at each decision point j ∈ J :
RˆTj :=
T∑
t=1
ˆ`t
j(x
t
j)− min
xˆj∈Xj
T∑
t=1
ˆ`t
j(xˆj).
With this, we can write the cumulative subtree regret at
decision point j as a sum of laminar regret at j plus a re-
currence term for each child decision point. Applying this
inductively gives the following theorem which tells us how
one can apply regret minimization locally on laminar regrets
in order to minimize regret in SDMs:
Theorem 2. The cumulative regret on X satisfies
RT ≤ max
xˆ∈X
∑
j∈J
pij(xˆ)Rˆ
T
j .
Corollary 1. If each individual laminar regret RˆTj on each
of the convex domains Xj grows sublinearly, overall regret
on X grows sublinearly.
Theorem 2 shows that overall regret can be minimized by
minimizing each laminar regret separately. In particular, this
means that if we have a regret minimizer for each decision
point j that can handle the structure of the convex set Xj and
the convex loss from (3), then we can apply those regret min-
imizers individually at each information set, and Theorem 2
guarantees that overall regret will be bounded by a weighted
sum over those local regrets. For example, if each local regret
minimizer has regret that grows at a particular sublinear rate,
then the overall regret is also guaranteed to grow only at that
sublinear rate.
Our result gives an alternative proof of CFR. This is ar-
guably simpler than existing proofs, because we show directly
why regret over a sequential decision-making space decom-
poses into individual regret terms, as opposed to bounding
terms in order to fit the CFR framework. Finally, our result
also generalizes CFR to new settings: we show how CFR can
be implemented on arbitrary convex subsets of simplexes and
with convex losses rather than linear.
Sequence form for sequential decision processes
So far we have described the decision space as a product of
convex sets where the choice of each action is taken from
a subset of a simplex Xj ⊆ ∆nj . This formulation has a
drawback: the expected-value function for a given strategy
is not linear. Consider taking action a at decision point j. In
order to compute the expected overall contribution of that
decision, its local payoff gj,a has to be weighted by the prod-
uct of probabilities of all actions on the path to j and by xj,a.
So, the overall expected utility is nonlinear and non-convex.
We now present a well-known alternative representation of
this decision space which preserves linearity. While we will
mainly be working in the product space X , it will occasion-
ally be useful to move to this equivalent representation to
preserve linearity.
The alternative formulation is called the sequence form.
In that representation, every convex set j ∈ J is scaled by
the parent variable leading to j. In other words, the sum of
values at j now sum to the value of the parent variable. In this
formulation, the value of a particular action then represents
the probability of playing the whole sequence of actions
from the root to that action. This allows each term in the
expected loss to be weighted only by the sequence ending in
the corresponding action. The sequence form has been used to
instantiate linear programming (von Stengel, 1996) and first-
order methods (Hoda et al., 2010; Kroer et al., 2015, 2017)
for computing Nash equilibria of zero-sum EFGs. There
is a straightforward mapping between any x ∈ X to its
corresponding sequence form: simply assign each sequence
the product of probabilities in the sequence. Likewise, going
from sequence form to X can be done by dividing each xj,a
by the value xpj where pj is the entry in x corresponding to
the parent of j. We let µ be a function that maps each x ∈ X
to its corresponding sequence-form vector. For the reverse
direction µ−1, there is ambiguity because µ is not injective.
Nonetheless, an inverse can be computed in linear time.
Application Domains
Because we only need a finite sequential tree structure of the
decision space, our framework captures a very broad class of
SDM problems. In this section we describe how our frame-
work can be applied to a number of prominent applications,
such as POMDPs and EFGs. In general, our framework can
be applied to any SDM problem where one or more agents
are faced with a finite sequence of decisions that form a tree,
such that agents always remember all past actions. The spe-
cific decision problem at each stage may depend on the past
decisions as well as stochasticity. The fact that we require the
decision space to be tree structured might seem limiting from
the perspective of compactly representing the decision space.
However, this has successfully been dealt with in applica-
tions by using state- or value-estimation techniques, rather
than fully representing the original problem (Moravcˇı´k et al.,
2017; Jin, Levine, and Keutzer, 2018).
One example class of a single-agent decision problems
that we can model is finite-horizon POMDPs where the his-
tory of states and actions is remembered. In that case, each
decision point corresponds to a specific sequence of actions
and observations made by the agent. This setting is reminis-
cent of the POMDP setting considered by Jin, Levine, and
Keutzer (2018). This type of model can be used to model
sequential medical treatment planning when combined with
results on imperfect-recall abstraction (Lanctot et al., 2012;
Chen and Bowling, 2012; Kroer and Sandholm, 2016a), and
has potential applications in steering evolutionary adapta-
tion (Sandholm, 2015; Kroer and Sandholm, 2016b). Our
framework allows more general models for such problems
via our generalization to convex decision points and convex
losses; for example our framework could be used for regular-
ized models. For instance in a medical settings, we may want
to regularize the complexity of the treatment plan.
Extensive-form games with convex-concave
saddle-point structure
In an extensive-form game with perfect recall each player
faces a sequential decision-making problem, of the type de-
scribed in the previous section and in Figure 1. The set of
next potential decision points Cj,a is based on observations of
stochastic outcomes and actions taken by the other players.
Here, we will focus on two-player zero-sum EFGs with
perfect recall, but with slightly more general utility structure
than is usually considered. In particular, we assume that we
are solving a convex-concave saddle-point problem of the
following form:
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
{
µ(x)>Aµ(y) + d1(µ(x))− d2(µ(y))
}
, (6)
where X is the SDM polytope for Player 1 and Y is the
SDM polytope of Player 2. Each di is assumed to be a dilated
convex function of the form
di(µ(x)) =
∑
j∈J
µ(x)pjdj
(
µ(x)j
µ(x)pj
)
=
∑
j∈J
pij(x)`j(xj),
that is, in the form given in (1).
In standard EFGs, the loss function for each player at
each iteration t is defined to be the negative payoff vector
associated with the sequence-form strategy of the other player
at that iteration; since we additionally allow a regularization
term we also get a nonlinear convex term. More formally,
at each iteration t, the loss functions `tX : X → R and
`tY : Y → R for player 1 and 2 respectively are defined as
`tX : x 7→ 〈−Aµ(yt), µ(x)〉+ d1(x),
`tY : y 7→ 〈A>µ(xt), µ(y)〉+ d2(y),
whereA is the sequence-form payoff matrix of the game (von
Stengel, 1996). Some simple algebra shows that `tX and `
t
Y
are indeed separable (that is, they can be written in the form
of Equation 1), where each decision-point-level loss `tj,X and
`tj,Y is a convex function.
This choice of loss function is justified by the fact that
the induced regret-minimizing dynamics for the two players
lead to a convex-concave saddle-point problem. Specifically,
assume the two players play the game T times, accumulating
regret after each iteration as in Figure 2.
A folk theorem explains the tight connection between low-
regret strategies and approximate Nash equilibria. We will
need a more general variant of that theorem generalized to
X
Y
`t−1X
`t−1Y
xt
yt `tY
`tX
X
Y
xt+1
yt+1 · · ·· · ·
Figure 2: The flow of strategies and losses in regret min-
imization for games. The symbol denotes computa-
tion/construction of the loss function.
(6). The convergence criterion we are interested in is the
saddle-point residual (or gap) ξ of (x¯, y¯), defined as
ξ=max
yˆ
{d1(x¯)−d2(yˆ)+〈x¯, Ayˆ〉}−min
xˆ
{d1(xˆ)−d2(y¯)+〈xˆ, Ay¯〉}
We show that playing the average of a sequence of regret-
minimizing strategies leads to a bounded saddle-point resid-
ual. This result is probably known, but it is unclear whether
it has been stated in the form here. We provide a proof in the
appendix. A closely related form is used for averaged strategy
iterates in a first-order method by Nemirovski (2004).
Theorem 3. If the average regret accumulated on X and
Y by the two sets of strategies {xt}Tt=1 and {yt}Tt=1 is 1
and 2, respectively, then any strategy profile (x¯, y¯) such
that µ(x¯) = 1T
∑T
t=1 µ(x
t), µ(y¯) = 1T
∑T
t=1 µ(y
t) has a
saddle-point residual bounded by 1 + 2.
The above averaging is performed in the sequence-form
space, which works because that space is also convex. After
averaging we can easily compute x¯ in linear time. Hence, by
applying LRD to the decision spaces X and Y , we converge
to a small saddle-point residual.
The fact that the averaging of the strategies is performed in
sequence form explains why the traditional CFR presentation
requires averaging with weights based on the player’s reaches
pij at each decision point j.
Theorem 3 shows that a Nash equilibrium can be com-
puted by taking the uniform distribution over sequence-form
strategy iterates. However, in the practical EFG-solving lit-
erature another approach called linear averaging has been
popular Tammelin et al. (2015), especially for the CFR+ al-
gorithm. In linear averaging a weighted average strategy is
constructed, where each strategy µ(xt) is weighted by t. Tam-
melin et al. (2015) show that this is guaranteed to converge
specifically when using the RM+ regret minimizer. It would
be interesting to prove when this works more generally. Here
we make the simple observation that we can compute both
averages, and simply use the one with better practical perfor-
mance, even in settings where only the uniform average is
guaranteed to converge.
Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) Ling, Fang, and
Kolter (2018) show that a reduced-normal-form QRE can
be expressed as the convex-concave saddle-point problem
(6) where d1 and d2 are the (convex) dilated entropy func-
tions usually used in first-order methods (FOMs) for solving
EFGs (Hoda et al., 2010; Kroer et al., 2015, 2017). This
saddle-point problem can be solved using FOMs, which
would lead to fast convergence rate due to the strongly con-
vex nature of the dilated entropy distance (Kroer et al., 2017).
However, until now, no algorithms based on local regret mini-
mization at each decision point have been known for this prob-
lem. Because the dilated entropy function separates into a
sum over negative entropy terms at each decision point it can
be incorporated as a convex loss in LRD. Combined with any
regret-minimization algorithm that allows convex functions
over the simplex, this leads to the first regret-minimization
algorithm for computing (reduced-normal-form) QREs.
Perturbed EFGs and equilibrium refinement Equilib-
rium refinements are Nash equilibria with additional impor-
tant rationality properties. Such equilibria have rarely been
used in practice due to scalability issues. Recently, fast al-
gorithms for computing approximate refinements were intro-
duced Kroer, Farina, and Sandholm (2017); Farina, Kroer,
and Sandholm (2017). Theorem 1 gives a new tool for con-
structing such methods: it immediately implies correctness of
the method of Farina, Kroer, and Sandholm (2017), while also
allowing new types of refinements and regret minimizers.
Erratum about Alternation in CFR+
Several tweaks to speed up the convergence of CFR have
been proposed. The state of the art is CFR+ (Tammelin et
al., 2015). CFR+ consists of three tweaks: the RM+ regret
minimizer, linear averaging, and alternation. RM+ can be
applied in our setting as well; it is simply an alternative regret
minimizer for linear losses over a simplex. We described
linear averaging earlier in this paper. Finally, alternation is
the idea that at iteration t, we provide Player 2 with the utility
vector associated with the current iterate of Player 1, rather
than that of the previous iteration, as is normally done in
regret minimization. Figure 3 illustrates how this works, in
contrast with Figure 2 which shows the usual flow. Tammelin
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Figure 3: The alternation method for CFR in games. The
loss at iteration t for y is computed with xt. The symbol
denotes computation/construction of the loss function.
et al. (2015) state that they prove convergence of CFR+;
however their proof relies on the folk theorem linking Nash
equilibrium and regret. That folk theorem is only proven for
the case where no alternation is applied. We show below that
the theorem does not hold with alternation!
Observation 1. Let the action spaces for the players be
X = Y = [0, 1], and let `tX : x 7→ x ·yt, `tY : y 7→ −y ·xt+1
be bilinear loss functions (the superscript t+ 1 comes from
the use of alternation—see Figure 3). Consider the sequence
of strategies xt = t mod 2, yt = (t+ 1) mod 2. A simple
check reveals that after 2T iterations, the average regrets
of the two players are both 0. Yet, the average strategies
x¯2T = y¯2T = 0.5 do not converge to a saddle point of xy.
This observation should be seen as more of a theoretical
issue than practical; alternation has been used extensively
in practice, and the problem that we show does not seem to
come up for nondegenerate iterates (at least for CFR+; it
may explain some erratic behavior that we have anecdotally
observed with other regret minimization algorithms when
using alternation).
Experiments
We conducted multiple kinds of experiments on two EFG
settings. The first game is Leduc 5 poker (Southey et al.,
2005), a standard benchmark in imperfect-information game
solving. There is a deck consisting of 5 unique cards with 2
copies of each. There are two rounds. In the first round, each
player places an ante of 1 in the pot and receives a single
private card. A round of betting then takes place with a two-
bet maximum, with Player 1 going first. A public shared card
is then dealt face up and another round of betting takes place.
Again, Player 1 goes first, and there is a two-bet maximum.
If one of the players has a pair with the public card, that
player wins. Otherwise, the player with the higher card wins.
All bets in the first round are 1, while all bets in the second
round are 2. The second game is a variant of Goofspiel (Ross,
1971), a bidding game where each player has a hand of cards
numbered 1 to N . A third stack of N cards is shuffled and
used as prizes: each turn a prize card is revealed, and the
players each choose a private card to bid on the prize, with
the high card winning, the value of the prize card is split
evenly on a tie. After N turns all prizes have been dealt out
and the payoff to each player is the sum of prize cards that
they win. We use N = 4 in our experiments.
First we investigate a setting where no previous regret-
minimization algorithms based on minimizing regret locally
existed: the computation of QREs via LRM and our more
general convex losses. Ling, Fang, and Kolter (2018) use
Newton’s method for this setting, but, as with standard Nash
equilibrium, second-order algorithms do not scale to large
games (this is why CFR+ has been so successful for creating
human-level poker AIs). We compare how quickly we can
compute QREs compared to how quickly Nash equilibria
can be computed, in order to understand how large games
we can expect to find QREs for with our approach. To do
this we run LRM with online gradient descent (OGD) at
each decision point. Because OGD is not guaranteed to stay
within the simplex at each iteration we need to project; this
can be implemented via binary search for decision points
with large dimension (Duchi et al., 2008), and via a constant-
size decision tree for low-dimension decision points. The
results are shown in Figure 4. We see that LRM performs
extremely well; in Goofspiel it converges vastly faster than
CFR+, and in Leduc 5 it converges at a rate comparable to
CFR+ and eventually becomes faster. This shows that QRE
computation via LRM likely scales to extremely large EFGs,
such as real-world-sized poker games (since CFR+ is known
to scale to such games).
In the second set of experiments we investigate the speed
of convergence for solving `2-regularized EFGs. Again we
include the convergence rate of standard CFR and CFR+ for
Nash equilibrium computation as a benchmark. The results
for Leduc 5 are in Figure 5. Solving the regularized game is
much faster than computing an Nash equilibrium via CFR+
except for extremely small amounts of regularization. Results
for Goofspiel are in the appendix; the results are very similar
to the ones for Leduc 5.
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Figure 4: The QRE saddle-point gap as a function of the
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Figure 5: The saddle-point gap as a function of the number
of iterations for `2-regularized Leduc 5 for varying regular-
ization amounts. The convergence rates of CFR+ for Nash
equilibrium is shown for reference.
In the third set of experiments we investigate the perfor-
mance of LRM in a single-agent-learning setting: learning
how to exploit a static opponent where we observe repeated
samples from their strategy. We consider a setting where the
exploiter wishes to maximally exploit subject to staying near
a pre-computed Nash equilibrium in order to avoid opening
herself up to exploitability (Ganzfried and Sandholm, 2011).
We model this in a new way: as a regularized online SDM
problem, where the loss for the exploiter is
`t(x) := 〈−Aµ(yt), µ(x)〉+ αD(x‖xNE) (7)
where yt is the t’th observation from the opponent’s strategy
and D(x‖xNE) is the dilated `2-based Bregman divergence
between the NE strategy xNE and x. The opponent’s subop-
timal strategy was computed by running CFR+ until a gap
of 0.1 was reached. We stop the training of the exploiter af-
ter 5000 iterations or when an average regret of 0.0005 was
reached, whichever happens first. Figure 6 shows the results.
The “utility increase” line shows how much the agent gains
by moving away from the Nash equilibrium and towards an
exploitative strategy, while the “exploitability” shows to what
extent the agent thereby opens herself up to being exploited
by an optimal adversary. We see that this model can indeed
be used as a scalable proxy for trading off exploitation and
exploitability by varying α.
Our experiments are preliminary: we use simple OGD
with very little tuning, and focus on iteration complexity
rather than runtime. There are several reasons to expect that
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Figure 6: The utility increase from exploitation, and the result-
ing increase in the agent’s own exploitability, as a function of
decreasing penalization on distance from Nash equilibrium
in (7). The straight line shows the value of best responding
(i.e. maximally exploiting) to the opponent strategy.
LRM for regularized games could be made much faster. For
one, the laminar losses are strongly convex, so accelerated
methods could be employed. This leads to significantly better
theoretical convergence rate than that of CFR+ for Nash
equilibrium, and could likely be exploited in practice also.
Furthermore, we used OGD for convenience, but one could
most likely employ a projection-free algorithm and thus have
the computational cost at each decision point be the same as
for CFR+ while getting a faster convergence rate.
Conclusions and Future Research
We presented LRD, a new decomposition of the regret asso-
ciated with a sequential action space into regrets associated
with individual decision points. We developed our technique
for general compact convex sets and convex losses at each de-
cision point, thus providing a generalization of CFR beyond
simplex decision points and linear loss. We then showed that
our results lead to a new class of regret-minimization algo-
rithms that solve SDM problems by minimizing regret locally
at each decision point. Although more general, our proof also
provides a new perspective on the CFR algorithm in terms
of our regret decomposition, and we explained the need for
weighting by reach as a consequence of averaging in se-
quence form. We then showed that our approach can be used
to compute regularized equilibria as well as Nash equilibrium
refinements, and gave the first regret-minimization algorithm
for computing (reduced-normal-form) quantal response equi-
librium (QRE) (based on local regrets). We showed exper-
imentally that even a preliminary variant of LRM can be
used to compute QREs in EFGs at a rate that is comparable
to Nash equilibrium finding using CFR+, thus yielding the
first algorithm for computing QREs in extremely large EFGs.
We similarly showed that `2-regularized equilibrium can be
computed very quickly with out method. Finally, we showed
how our approach can be used as a new approach to opponent
exploitation, and to control the tradeoff between exploitation
and exploitability.
It would be interesting to investigate tweaks to the algo-
rithms that use LRM in order to understand what variants
yield best practical performance. It would also be interesting
to find further applications where our new types of decision
spaces and loss functions can be used.
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Supplementary Material
In this appendix we provide supplementary material that did
not fit in the body of the paper.
Omitted proofs
Folk theorem for convex-concave saddle point problems
Here we will show a slightly more general version of the folk
theorem, where we allow convex losses. We must then eval-
uate the saddle-point residual ξ of (x¯, y¯), which is defined
as:
ξ = max
yˆ
{d1(x¯)− d2(yˆ) + 〈x¯, Ayˆ〉}
−min
xˆ
{d1(xˆ)− d2(y¯) + 〈xˆ, Ay¯〉}
We now show that playing the average of a sequence
of regret-minimizing strategies leads to a bounded saddle-
point residual. This result is also known, though it is unclear
whether it has been stated in the form used here. A very re-
lated form is used for averaged strategy iterates in a first-order
method by Nemirovski (2004).
Theorem 3. If the average regret accumulated on X and
Y by the two sets of strategies {xt}Tt=1 and {yt}Tt=1 is 1
and 2, respectively, then any strategy profile (x¯, y¯) such
that µ(x¯) = 1T
∑T
t=1 µ(x
t), µ(y¯) = 1T
∑T
t=1 µ(y
t) has a
saddle-point residual bounded by 1 + 2.
Proof.
RT1 :=
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
d1(x
t) + 〈xt, Ayt〉)
−min
xˆ
{d1(xˆ) + 〈xˆ, Ay¯〉} ≤ 1
RT2 :=
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
d2(y
t)− 〈xt, Ayt〉)
−min
yˆ
{d2(yˆ)− 〈x¯, Ayˆ〉} ≤ 2
Now, we are interested in evaluating the gap ξ of (x¯, y¯).
To this end:
ξ = max
yˆ
{d1(x¯)− d2(yˆ) + 〈x¯, Ayˆ〉}
−min
xˆ
{d1(xˆ)− d2(y¯) + 〈xˆ, Ay¯〉}
= max
yˆ
{−d2(yˆ) + 〈x¯, Ayˆ〉} −min
xˆ
{d1(xˆ) + 〈xˆ, Ay¯〉}
+ d1(x¯) + d2(y¯)
= −min
yˆ
{d2(yˆ)− 〈x¯, Ayˆ〉} −min
xˆ
{d1(xˆ) + 〈xˆ, Ay¯〉}
+ d1(x¯) + d2(y¯)
By convexity of d1 and d2 we can write
d1(x¯) + d2(y¯) ≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
d1(x
t) +
1
T
T∑
t=1
d2(y
t)
Substituting into the definition of ξ, we find that
ξ ≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
d2(y
t)−min
yˆ
{d2(yˆ)− 〈x¯, Ayˆ〉}
+
1
T
T∑
t=1
d1(x
t)−min
xˆ
{d1(xˆ) + 〈xˆ, Ay¯〉}
= RT1 +R
T
2
≤ 1 + 2,
as we wanted to show.
Theorem 2. The cumulative regret on X satisfies
RT ≤ max
xˆ∈X
∑
j∈J
pij(xˆ)Rˆ
T
j .
Proof. From Theorem 1 and by using the fact that
−min(f − g) ≤ −min f + max g
we get that the cumulative regret can be written as the follow-
ing recurrence:
RT4j ≤ RˆTj + maxxˆj∈Xj
∑
a∈Aj
xˆj,a
∑
j′∈Cj,a
RT4j′ .
Applying this recurrence inductively gives the theorem.
Additional experimental results
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Figure 7: The saddle-point gap as a function of the num-
ber of iterations for `2-regularized Goofspiel 4, for varying
regularization amounts.
